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TESTS OF CAUSATION AND THE FLORIDA JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - THE CURRENT CONFLICT AND THE
NEED FOR A CHANGE
INTRODUcrION

An essential element of a plaintiff's cause of action for negligence is a reasonable connection between an act or omission of the defendant and the damage
suffered by the plaintiff.' Courts label this connection "proximate cause" or
"legal cause". 2 There are two distinct problems within the concept of proximate
cause. The first concerns the actual causal relationship between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's injury.' This relationship, cause in fact, is usually
determined by use of either the "but for" or substantial factor tests of causation.
The second causal inquiry, usually called proximate cause 4 addresses whether
the injury incurred was sufficiently connected to the defendant's negligent act
or omission to warrant imposing liability. 5
Causation has been an area of concern in recent years in the formulation of
standard or pattern jury instructions. 6 Clear and accurate statements of the law
1. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 240 (4th ed. 1971).
2. The terms are interchangeable. See note 4 infra. Proximate cause is traditionally defined as that which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred. BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY 1391 (4th ed. 1968). See also Pope v. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., 120 So. 2d
227, 229 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1960), where Judge Wigginton, in a much cited opinion on proximate
cause, adopted the same definition as a statement of Florida law.
Proximate cause has been described as an unfortunate term for a mere limitation which
the courts have placed on an actor's responsibility for the consequences of his conduct. Dean
Prosser stated that there is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has caused more
disagreement or upon which there is more confusion of opinion than proximate cause. At
least part of the confusion may result from the fact that language appropriate to the solution
of policy considerations is carried over into discussions of cause in fact where it is of no
assistance and tends to obscure the issue. Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause,
21 MINN. L. REv. 19, 21 (1936). See note 29 and accompanying text, infra.
3. Strachan, The Scope and Application of the "But For" Rule, 33 Moo. L. REV. 386, 386
(1970).
4. Proximate cause is a highly confusing and misleading term. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text, infra. The word "proximate" occurs so seldomly in the English language that it
is not even listed as a frequently used word. See E. THORNDIKE & I. LORGE, THE TACHER'S
WORDBOOK OF 30,000 WORDS (1944). Consequently, some states have eliminated the term in
defining causation. See, e.g., FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS 5.1 (1967) where the term
"legal cause" is used in place of "proximate cause."
5. See Strachan, supra note 3, at 386.
6. The terms "standard" and "pattern" are synonymous. Other names used for standardized instructions include: model, uniform, approved and recommended jury instructions.
See R.

NIELAND, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: A

CRITICAL LOOK AT A MODERN APPROACH TO

IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEM 2 (1979). Standard jury instructions are defined as formulated or
specimen copies of instructions which are uniquely suited for repeated use and application in
typical cases. See Smith, Orthodoxy v. Reform in the Jury System: Pattern Jury InstructionsA Revolution, 51 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 344, 344 (1968). See also R. McBRIDE, THE ART OF INSTRUCrING THE JURY 338 (1969), where the definition is further narrowed to instructions prepared by
a recognized judicial group within a single jurisdiction.
The original idea to standardize instructions can be traced to a meeting of the Ohio Coin-
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are essential in charges to the jury, for misdirected or confused jurors cannot
return a valid decision based on applicable law.7 Thus, jury instruction committees" must produce instructions that express the applicable issues and guid-

ing legal principles in brief, understandable language without argument, un9
,
necessary repetition or reliance on negative charges.
The Supreme Court of Florida Committee on Standard Jury Instructions
currently faces the task of re-evaluating the Florida standard jury instructions
on causation.' ° This re-evaluation focuses on the issue of whether the instructions on legal cause should adopt the substantial factor test" of cause in fact or
2
continue to apply the older and more common "but for" test.' There has been
3
doubt expressed as to whether Florida recognizes the substantial factor test,'
4
although the test has been favored by the Florida supreme court.' This question primarily involves the cause in fact aspect of the concept of proximate
mon Pleas Judges Association, but the project was eventually abandoned. However, the effort
was revived in 1958 when the present Ohio committee on jury instructions was organized. Id.
at 340. The first completed set of standard jury instructions originated in California in 1938
when Judge William J. Palmer, regarded as the father of pattern jury instructions, headed a
committee which produced the first edition of CALFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL (1943).

The success of the California effort "encouraged other jurisdictions to formulate standard instructions. See Alfini, Pattern Jury Instructions, American Judicature Society Report No. 6
24 (1971). As of 1979, 45 states have approved or are in the process of developing standard
jury instructions. For a complete list, see R. NiELAND, supra note 6, at 71.
7.

Note, Missouri PatternJury Instructions- jury Confusion and th e ,Role of the Trial

Judge, 40 U. Mo.-KAN. Crr L. REv. 228, 237 (1971).
8. Standard jury instructions are developed in most jurisdictions by committees operating
under the auspices of the highest court of the jurisdiction, a bar association, or a judges',
association. For a complete listing of sponsorships in various jurisdictions, see Alfini, supra
note 6, at 24. The Florida Committee was appointed by the supreme court in 1962. See
FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS ix (1967).
9. See generally FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS ix (1967); ILLINOIS PATTERN JURy
INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL Vi (2d ed. 1974). See also R. NEILAND,supra note 6, at 13, where the author

lists the purpose of standardized instructions as being impartiality of the charge, uniformity,
time saving, reduction of appeals, accuracy in stating the law, and increased juror comprehension.
Negative charges are those which tell the jury not to do something, and they are considered
confusing to jurors. See ILLINOIS PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL vi (2d ed. 1974).
10. The Florida Standard Jury Instructions were adopted by a resolution of the Supreme
Court of Florida on April 19, 1967. In re Standard Jury Instructions, 198 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1967).
By that order the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions was continued as
a committee of the court for the purpose of reviewing errors and inaccuracies and recommending to the court amen~dments and revisions. 198 So. 2d at 320.
11. Interview with William N. Avera, member of the Supreme Court Committee on
Standard Jury Instructions, in Gainesville, Florida (June 28, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Interview]. Mr. Avera stated that the committee has formulated a tentative proposed instruction
utilizing the substantial factor test, but-that this has not yet been submitted to the supreme
court for approval. The instruction is as follows: "5.1(a), Legal cause generally: Negligence is
a legal cause of (loss) (injury) (or) (damage) if it directly and in natural and continuous
sequence has a substantial part in producing such (loss) (injury) (or) (damage)."
12. See FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS 5.1(a) (1967). The question is whether the

"but for" or substantial factor test more accurately states the law of Florida.
13. See notes 115-116 and accompanying text, infra.
14. See notes 134-135 and accompanying text, infra.
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cause, however changes in a cause in fact instruction carry over to subsequent
instructions on concurrent and intervening causes. 15
This note will focus on the development and use of the "but for" and substantial factor tests and their adoption in standard jury instructions. The discussion will include the background of proximate cause, assessment of the "but
for" and substantial factor tests, and an evaluation of standard jury instructions
on causation as used in Florida and selected other jurisdictions. The note will
propose changes in Florida jury instructions on legal cause that will further the
purpose of the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions.- G
THE BIFURCATED CONCEPT OF PROXIMATE CAUSE

For nearly a century, judges and writers have struggled to unravel the
tangled notions of fact and policy in the realm of proximate cause. At the close
of the last century, courts used the term "cause" indiscriminately to express
either their conclusions as to facts or as a means of explaining, through policy
considerations, what consequences the law should impose on a defendant's
conduct.'7 This meshing of fact and policy still exists, and the search continues
for a language technique that will enable courts to deal with the two components of proximate cause separately and effectively.' s
In tort controversies, the focal point for legal scrutiny has been the issue of
causation.19 Proximate cause presents questions of extraordinary difficulty which
most writers conclude cannot be reduced to definite rules.20 The issue is essentially one of balancing the protection to be afforded the plaintiff's interest
against the risk involved in the defendant's conduct. 21 The balance must be

determined upon the facts of each case without resort to any definitive forConsequently, tort lawyers traditionally distinguish between two
meanings of the word "cause". 23 Under the rubric of cause in fact, attention is

mula.22

15. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL BAJI 3.75-.78 (6th ed. 1977), which has
alternative instructions for the "but for" and substantial factor tests and consequently requires separate instructions on concurrent causes for both tests. Compare BAJI 3.75-.78 supra
with FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS 5.1, Note on Use (1967), which states that instruction 5.1(b) on concurrent causes does not set forth any additional standard for the jury to
consider in determining legal cause.
16. See note 9 and accompanying text, supra. The primary emphasis will be on accuracy
in stating the law.
17. Malone, Ruminations on Cause in Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 60 (1956).
18. Id.
19. Weinrib, A Step Forward in Factual Causation, 38 MOD. L. REv. 518, 530 (1975).
20. Prosser, supra note 2, at 20. See also Asgrow-Kilgore v. Mulford Hickerson Corp., 301
So. 2d 441, 444 (Fla. 1974) (more easily defined than applied, the concept of proximate cause
can be quite difficult).
21. L. GREENE, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 126 (1927). For a rudimentary point of
view, see Healy v. Hoy, 115 Minn. 321, 322, 132 N.W. 208, 209 (1911), where Justice Start of
the Minnesota supreme court commented that proximate cause is usually nothing more than
common sense to be applied in the form of instructions to the jury.
22. L. GREENE, supra note 21, at 126.
23. A study of any substantial number of decisions demonstrates that proximate cause is
not a single problem but actually a group of problems or component parts. The following
classification of component parts is suggested by Prosser: (1) Cause in fact; (2) apportionment
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directed to the simple question of what happened and whether the defendant's
conduct produced the injury.24 This is a factual question for the jury. The
second concept, proximate cause, deals with a more complex question: assuming
that the defendant's conduct did result in the injury, whether the law should
attach any legal consequences to the defendant's conduct. 25 This inquiry, being
a question of responsibility or remoteness, involves both law and policy. It is
2
thus a question for the trial court. 6
The distinction27 between causation in fact and causation in law is crucial
to the plaintiff's case. For the plaintiff to succeed, the court must be satisfied
that the defendant's conduct was a cause, both in fact and in law, of the
injury.28 The two concepts of cause thus perform separate functions in the
resolution of tort disputes, and are associated only by the common label of
"proximate cause".2 Failure to distinguish between causation in fact and
causation in law, or proximate cause, is a fundamental error, and any attempt
to state one in terms of the other leads to confusion30
CAUSE IN FAcr: Ti

THRESHOLD INQUIRY

Causation is a matter of fact, and conduct which is not causal in fact cannot
be causal in law. 1 Thus, proof of a cause in fact relationship is a necessary
of damages; (3) unforeseeable consequences; (4) superseding causes; (5) shifted responsibility;
(6) duty to the plaintiff; and (7) plaintiff's fault. Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38
CAL. L. Rav. 369, 374 (1950). Of these component parts, numbers two through seven are
proximate cause. Florida cases which demonstrate this include Nicholas v. Miami Burglar
Alarm Co., 339 So. 2d 175, 177 (Fla. 1976) (distinguishing cause in fact from proximate
cause); Courtney v. American Oil Co., 220 So. 2d 675, 677 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1969) (distinguishing the two functions of the concept of proximate cause).
24. Weinrib, supra note 19, at 518.
25. Id.
26. See Prosser, supra note 23, at 419.
27. This distinction between the concepts of fact and policy corresponds to what is sometimes called the explanatory context and the attributive inquiry. The explanatory context is
said to be the explanation, in causal terms, of the various factors which have combined to
produce a result. The attributive inquiry is the court's task of determining whether harms
produced should be attributed to a defendant's conduct. This bifurcation of causal questions
is also termed the distinction between causation in fact and causation in law. H. Hart
A. Honere, CAUSAION IN THE LAw 22 (1959).
28. Weinrib, supra note 19, at 518.
29. Malone, supra note 17, at 60. Professor Malone considers the term a confusing similarity of language. However, he contends that cause in fact is not purely a question of fact
but, like proximate cause, includes policy considerations. The difference between the two is,
in his opinion, only a matter of degree. For a similar view, see Bohen, Mixed Questions of
Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 111 (1924).
30. See L. GEmENE, supra note 21, at 126. Proximate cause is qualitative in that the
nature of the conduct is such that the law will attach consequences; cause in fact is quantitative in that there must be a sufficient connection between the conduct and the injury to hold
the defendant liable. Proximate cause requires a conclusion by the court in every case, whereas
cause in fact is a jury question. In Greene's opinion, the courts have insisted on converting
all types of problems into causation issues, and this has resulted in causation being overemphasized. See also Prosser, supra note 23, at 375.
31. See Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damages, 47 HaRv. L. REv. 1127, 1130 (1934).
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element of the legal theory of negligence. The law of negligence comprehends
a two-stage process involving not only plaintiff compensation, but defendant
deterrence as well. 82 While requiring individual responsibility for the consequences of one's own acts, the law of negligence imposes no liability for acts,
however abominable, which cause no injury to the complainant.33 The cause
in fact requirement 4 accordingly prevents litigation from being transformed
into a general comparative survey of the moral qualities and defects of the
litigants.35
For reasons of fundamental fairness, the defendant is not liable when he
has not caused the plaintiff's injury.36 Cause in fact limits a negligence action
to factors relevant to the injury for which the plaintiff seeks redress. 37 Cause in
fact can be determinative of the issue of fault, because the defendant's conduct,
negligent or not, must have caused the plaintiff's injury or liability is not imposed.38 However, the converse is not true because of the bifurcated nature of
proximate cause. A finding that the defendant caused the injury does not necessarily mean that liability attaches, because the court must still assess whether
the factual causation should have legal consequences.3 9 Cause in fact functions
as a test of exclusion which allows courts to screen some defendants without
having to decide whether their conduct was legally culpable.40 Traditionally,

Cause in fact analysis determines what has already occurred, and is a necessary antecedent to
attaching legal consequences.
32. For an analysis of causation in terms of deterrence, spreading, and distributional goals,
see Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43
U. CHI. L. REv. 69, 71 (1975).
33. Weinrib, supra note 19, at 518.
34. The cause in fact requirement is universally insisted on by the courts. See, e.g., Vines
v. Plantation Motor Lodge, 336 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (Ala. 1976) (to recover for negligence, a
causal connection must be established between the violation and the injury); Harvan v.
Kenan, 157 Fla. 603, 604, 26 So. 2d 668, 669 (1946) (negligence is not actionable without causal
connection to the injury); Grace v .Kumalaa, 47 Haw. 281, 285, 386 P.2d 872, 876 (1963) (there
must be a causal connection between a negligent act and an injury); Frederick v. Goff, 251
Iowa 290, 297, 100 N.W.2d 624, 628 (1960) (negligence is irrelevant in absence of causal connection to injury); Rivera v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 856, 857, 182 N.E.2d 284, 285 (1962)
(negligence must have caused accident from which injury flows).
35. As a matter of practical necessity, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes
which are so close to the result or of such significance that the law is justified in making the
defendant pay. This limitation is usually one of law and policy rather than of cause in fact,
but cause in fact must be found before policy and law limitations can be considered. See
L. GREENE, supra note 21, at 122.
36. See Byrd, Actual Causation in North Carolina Tort Law, 50 N.C.L. Rv. 261, 262
(1972). For a discussion of proximate cause in the sense of responsibility, in North Carolina,
see Byrd, Proximate Cause in North Carolina, 51 N.C.L. REv. 951 (1973). See also Pope v.
Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., 120 So. 2d 227, 229 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1960) (stating methods of
determining proximate cause).
37. Weinrib, supra note 19, at 518.
38. Id.
39. See note 30 and accompanying text, supra.
40. See F. HARPEmR & F. JAMEs, THE LAw OF TORTS 1110 (1956). See also J. FLEMING, AN
INTRODuCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 109 (1967), in which the author refers to cause in fact as
the "screening of all claims."
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two different methods of analysis are employed to solve the cause in fact issue. 41
These are the "but for" and substantial factor tests.
The TraditionalView: The "But For" Test

To determine whether the defendant's conduct may be deemed to have been
a cause of the plaintiff's injury, the majority of jurisdictions42 apply the "but
for" 43 or sine qua non44 test of cause in fact. The test may be stated as follows:
the defendant's conduct is a cause of the plaintiff's injury if the injury would
not have occurred but for the conduct of the defendant.4 In a sense, this inquiry is a purely factual one that seeks to eliminate from the mass of actions
which antedate an injury, those which fall outside the causal chain leading to
the injury.46 This makes policy considerations inoperative, since no policy can
be strong enough to warrant the imposition of liability for loss to which the
defendant's behavior has not, in fact, contributed.47 The test precludes liability
when fairness so requires,48 resulting in the test operating as a rule of exdu41. See generally J. FLEMiN, supra note 40, at 170; F. HAPa
1110; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1971).

&F. JAMES, supa note 40, at

42. "The dominance of the 'but for' test is a result of the urge to banish evaluative considerations from the realm of cause in fact. This test is the most mechanical method of
handling cause in fact, and therefore it seems to be the most suitable for excluding the considerations of policy, which by their nature are too flexible and delicate to be susceptible to
an automatic form of treatment." Weinrib, supra note 19, at 530. For a sampling of jurisdictions using the "but for" test, see, e.g., Crank v. Iowa Power & Light, 258 Iowa 603, 138
N.W.2d 843 (1965); Gard v. Sherwood Constr. Co., 194 Kan. 541, 400 P.2d 995 t1965); Nance
v. Parks, 266 N.C. 204, 146 S.E.2d 24 (1966); Stout v. Rutherford, 341 P.2d 266 (Okla. 1962);
Stoneman v. Wick Constr. Co., 55 Wash. 2d 639, 349 P.2d 215 (1963).
43. Professor Malone credits David Hume with originating the "but for" test. See Malone,
supra note 17, at 67. For an in-depth discussion of the influence of David Hume and John
Stuart Mill on causation, see H. HART &A. HoNER, supra note 27, at 12.
44. "That without which the thing cannot be; an indispensable or requisite condition."
BLAcK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 1556 (4th ed. 1968). The terms "but for" and sine qua non are used
synonomously. See W. PRossER, supranote 1, at 239.
45. Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CAL. L. REv. 229,
896 (1932). This statement of the "but for" test is sometimes put in negative form and applied
as a test of what is not the cause of an event. Thus stated, the defendant's conduct is not the
cause of an event if the occurrence would have taken place without it. See Smith, Legal Cause
in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REv. 103, 109 (1925). In more classical statements of the test,
the term "without which" is often substituted for "but for." See, e.g., Pope v. Pinkerton-Hays
Lumber Co., 120 So. 2d 227, 229 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1960) ("proximate cause is that cause which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have happened").
46. Strachan, supra note 3,at 387, 389. But see Malone, supra note 17, at 65, where the
author states that causation in fact, like causation in law, is intimately concerned with policy
considerations.
47. 1. Fleming, supra note 40, at 176. If the event would not have occurred but for the
defendant's conduct, liability still will not necessarily exist, since considerations other than
cause in fact must be taken into account in the second step of the bifurcated approach to
proximate cause. There is no absolute rule that a defendant is a legal cause for a tortious act
anywhere in the chain of antecedents, no matter how far back. The defendant's conduct must
by distinctly traceable as a substantial antecedent. See Smith, supra note 45, at 109.
48. Byrd, supra note 36, at 265. See notes 33.5 and accompanying text, supra.
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sion.49 The "but for" test marks the minimum requirement for imposing fault,
and if the jury reaches this threshold, the court must further investigate and
determine proximate cause or causation in law. 50
The cause in fact requirement is one of the indispensable elements of proximate cause.5 1 As restricted to the question of factual causation, and regarded
merely as a rule of exclusion, the "but for" test may serve to explain the majority of cases.5 2 Most cases involve either a single cause or a number of dependent and individually insufficient causes which are each susceptible to the
"but for" test.5 3 For example, if the defendant negligently drives his car at
an excessive speed, his conduct is not a cause in fact of a collision if the accident
would have occurred even had he been driving at a reasonable speed.5 4 "But
for" the defendant's excessive speed the accident would have occurred in any
event. Similarly, when two noises, each of which alone is insufficient to cause
harm, combine to produce a harmful volume, both defendants are liableY5
"But for" each defendant's contribution, there would have been no tort. While
the "but for" test functions acceptably in these types of cases, there are several
areas where it fails significantly.
The first problem area is that of concurrent, individually sufficient causes.
If two causes concur to produce an injury and either one operating alone would
have been sufficient to produce the identical result, a test other than the "but
for" test is needed,5 An example of this situation includes the famous "twin
fires" 57 case in which a fire of unknown origin merged with a fire started by the
defendant railroad's train, destroying the plaintiff's house. A similar situation
arose in a case where the plaintiff suffered a reduced crop yield from the concurrent effects of a negligently sprayed herbicide and a plant disease. 58 When
two causes, either of which is capable of causing the injury, combine to bring
about harm, a defendant responsible for either cause may be held liable.-9 Be49. Prosser, supra note 2, at 23.
50. See Malone, supra note 17, at 36. This raises the question of why the minimal relationship for imposing liability was established at this point rather than some other. The "but for"
test might be the best the law can offer to express an accepted popular attitude toward responsibility. Society does not wish to impose blame on someone whose conduct had nothing
to do with an injury, but there must be some expression of the attitude toward resopnsibility.
If judgment is to be selective and have an effect on future conduct, it must begin from some
point such as the "but for" inquiry.
51. See Smith, supra note 45, at 309.
52. See Interview, supra note 11. This statement was confirmed by Mr. Avera as being
applicable in Florida. See also Prosser, supra note 2, at 23.
53. See Weinrib, supra note 19, at 520. These cases are so easily resolved that few are ever
appealed. Consequently, most such cases are unreported.
54. See, e.g., Holland v. Malpass, 225 N.C. 395, 121 S.E.2d 576 (1961).
55. See, e.g., Lambton v. Mellish [18941 3 Ch. 163.
56. See generally sources cited in notes 40-41, supra.
57. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920).
58. Asgrow-Kilgore v. Mulford Hickerson Corp., 301 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1974).
59. In the absence of one of the causes or acts, the result would be the same, and it is
unacceptable to allow either or both of the wrongdoers to excape liability. See, e.g., Colonial
Stores, Inc. v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 279 F. 2d 777, 779 (5th Cir. 1960) (where negligent acts
of two tortfeasors combine to produce injury, each is a proximate cause); De La Concha v.
Pinero, 104 So. 2d 25, 27 (Fla. 1958) (where injury results from negligent acts of two persons
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cause the conduct of each defendant was sufficient to produce the injury, the
"but for" test alone would permit both wrongdoers to escape and leave an
innocent plaintiff to bear the loss caused by their combined conduct.60 If both
actors were negligent, the plaintiff should not suffer the burden of loss while
each defendant shifts the blame to the other.6 However, where one cause is
innocent, holding the defendant liable for the entire damage is more problematic.62 This possibility points to the need for supplementing the "but for"
test so that a condition may rank as a cause if it was necessary to produce the
result, or if it would have caused the injury had no other condition sufficient to
63
do so been present.
A second problem arises when alternative causes exist, and a similar but
64
not identical result would have occurred without one defendant's conduct.
The most common examples of these cases are those in which two or more
defendants, such as hunters6 5 or police officers,66 negligently discharge firearms
in the direction of the plaintiff, who is struck by a single shot. If the proof
establishes that the conduct of only one defendant caused the harm but fails to

identify the responsible party, a causal connection between the injury and the
concurrently, both acts are proximate causes); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Walters, 248
Miss. 206, 226, 158 So. 2d 2, 20 (1963) (if defendant's negligence proximately contributed to
injury, he is liable even if his negligence was not the sole proximate cause); Green v. Kahn,
391 S.W.2d 269, 277 (Mo. 1965) (one whose negligence combines with the negligence of another to cause injury is liable); Michaelsohn v. Smith, 113 N.W.2d 571, 573 (N.D. 1962) (where
concurring negligent acts are proximate causes of an injury, each tortfeasor is responsible for
the result). See also Byrd, supranote 36, at 265.
60. See Byrd, supra note 36, at 265.
61. See J. FI.EmN, TnE LAW oF ToRTs 182 (5th ed. 1977). In addition, the resultwould
be unsatisfactory if a fully sufficient cause did not qualify while a less than sufficient cause
would impose liability on its perpretrator.
62. Id. See, e.g., Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W.45
(1920). See text accompanying note 57 supra.
63. See Byrd, supra note 36, at 265. Byrd notes that since in these situations the defendant's negligence has combined with an innocent cause to produce the same injury that
would have occurred without the innocent cause, it may be argued that the defendant's attempt to escape liability deserves little sympathy. He points out, however, the fallacy of the
argument's in that the goal of tort law is to compensate the injured party, not to punish the
offender. Therefore, application of the rule that a condition is a cause if necessary to produce
the injury must be defended on grounds of deterrence rather than compensation; any injustice to the plaintiff that would have occurred by the innocent force is not apparent. See also
Calabresi, supra note 32, at 74.
64. This is hypothetically stated as follows: where A and B each sell identical ropes to C,
who wishes to hang himself, and C hangs himself with A's rope. See Carpenter, supra note 45,
at 396. Alternatively, C could have hanged himself with B's rope, so the conduct of both A
and B is causally connected to C's death.
65. See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (plaintiff hit by shotgun
pellet when two hunters simultaneously fired in his direction); Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852,
110 So. 666 (1927) (two hunters shot in direction of plaintiff, who was hit in the eye by one

pellet).
66. See, e.g., Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974) (highway patrolmen fired
in direction of a group of college students, injuring some of them); Moore v. Foster, 182 Miss.
15, 180 So. 73 (1938) (two police officers shot at plaintiff at same time and one bullet hit him
in the arm).
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fault of either of the wrongdoers has not been established. 7 However, as in
concurring causes, the defendants' wrongful acts have caused the harm, and the
presence of an alternative set of conditions sufficient to produce the injury is
immaterial.6 Again, the "but for" test alone is inadequate. As in cases of concurring causes which are not alternative in nature, the test would permit both
wrongdoers to escape liability, finding the other's conduct sufficient to cause the
69
injury.
Finally, the "but for" test is inadequate in situations in which independent
factors, each sufficient to produce an injury, are successive rather than concurrent or alternative.70 Successive causation is frequently encountered in chain
collisions of automobiles, where fault exists on the part of several defendants
whose conduct has resulted in damage through separate consecutive impacts.71
If the first cause is innocent and the second cause is tortious, the "but for" test
functions acceptably.72 However, where the first injury is tortious and the
second injury innocent, the test fails to meet the obvious demands of justice,

67. See Byrd, supra note 36, at 273.
68. See note 60 and accompanying text, supra. As tangential theory, some cases have applied res ipsa loquitur when uncertainty has existed concerning which of several defendants
was negligent. In Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944), res ipsa loquitur
was applied to allow recovery for a plaintiff injured while undergoing surgery by an unidentified member of a group of doctors and nurses. The doctrine has also been used
against multiple defendants who comprise a distribution chain for products. See, e.g.,
Dement v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 382 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1960) (manufacturer and
retailer); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953) (manufacturer, distributor and
retailer). But see Bess Ambulance, Inc. v. Boll, 208 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1968) (res ipsa
loquitur held improper where semiconscious patient fell off a hospital cot); Nut v. James, 162
So. 2d 700 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1964) (res ipsa loquitur rejected where air conditioning duct fell
on plaintiff).
69. See Peaslee, supra note 31, at 1129. Res ipsa loquitur would be inappropriate where
there are alternative causes, as alternative causes are multiple and concurrent and the defendants are identifiable.
70. Hypothetically, A is injured by B and later by C in such a way that the injury by C
was sufficient to have caused the damage inflicted by B. See Strachan, supra note 3, at 391.
71. The negligent conduct of the defendant who causes the first impact creates a situation
in which subsequent persons can cause damage, and the first defendant may be liable for all
the loss. See, e.g., Mansell v. Eidge, 179 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965) (plaintiff's car
struck from rear and pushed into other lane, where it was struck by a third; the car which
caused initial collision held liable for all damage); Hall v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 234 N.C. 206,
67 S.E.2d 63 (1961) (when plaintiff, dazed by first collision, walked into path of third car,
defendant who caused the first collision held liable for the entire damage); Checker Yellow
Cab Co. v. Shiflett, 351 P.2d 660 (Wyo. 1960) (concurrent negligence of taxicab and truck in
first collision were both causes of second collision). But see Hughes v. Great Am. Indem. Co.,
236 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1956) (plaintiff, injured in head-on collision, further injured when his
car was hit again by a third car three minutes later, allowed to recover only from driver of
third car for injuries received in second collision).
72. It is a familiar doctrine that the tortfeasor takes his plaintiff as he finds him. If the
plaintiff has suffered injury from a prior innocent act which is made worse by a subsequent
tortious act, the subsequent tortfeasor is liable for all the damage. See J. FLEMING, supra note
40, at 184.
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because it would impose full liability on the first tortfeasor, who did not cause
all the damage.73
The above examples reveal the unreliability of "but for" analysis. The
primary function of a test of cause in fact is to exclude irrelevant conduct, and
the "but for" test is inherently incapable of performing this function.7 4 The
test attempts to poise the causation inquiry on an abstract plane free of evaluative overtones.7 5 Such an attempt ignores the irresistible urge of jurors to pass
judgment while observing the development of facts 6 Rejected by the courts of
numerous jurisdictions, 77 the "but for" test appears adequate only where single
or dependent and individually insufficient causal factors exist78 The cases in
which cause in fact can be established by the "but for" test are usually easily
resolved, thereby making the test most helpful when least needed7 9
A Modern Approach: The SubstantialFactor Test
The failures of the "but for" test have led to the adoption of a broader,
simpler test under which the defendant's conduct is considered a cause if it was
a material element or substantial factor in bringing about the injury.80 The
substantial factor test involves the determination not only of the extent to
which the defendant's conduct contributed to the injury, but also whether his
conduct's contribution warrants holding him liable for the harm.8 ' The substantial factor test thus bars liability where the defendant's conduct has made
an insignificant contribution to the plaintiff's injury, or where the same harm
8 2
would have resulted without the defendant's negligence.
83
The material element or substantial factor test was first proposed in
73. The potential imposition of full liability on the first tortfeasor exposes the limitations
of the "but for" test. See Strachan, supra note 3, at 394.
74. See Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. Rxv. 941, 948 (1935). Carpenter
states that the test actually operates as a rule of inclusion, not exclusion, because it can determine whether a factor is a cause, but not if a factor is not a cause. See notes 47-50 and
accompanying text, supra. The more accepted view is that the test is one of exclusion, but
that it is not capable of excluding innocent parties in all cases. See also Carpenter, supra note
45, at 235 (the "but for" test would often impose liability for very remote acts where the
defendant's conduct was an insignificant factor).
75. See Malone, supra note 17, at 66. Professor Malone labels the "but for" test "an
intellectual strait jacket to which the human mind will not willingly submit." Id. at 67.
76. Id.
77. See note 94 infra.
78. See text accompanying note 53 sup-a.
79. See Weinrib, supra note 19, at 522.
80. See R STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs §§ 431-433 (1965). For cases in which the substantial factor test has been applied, see note 94 infra.
81. Id. § 431, Comment a. The word "substantial" denotes the fact that the defendant's
conduct has so significant an effect in producing the injury that reasonable men regard it as
a cause of the injury. The test is one of significance or contribution; it is only where the
evidence shows the defendant's conduct had some effect that the question of whether the
effect was substantial rather than negligible becomes important. See, e.g., McDowell v. Davies,
104 Ariz. 69, 71, 448 P.2d 869, 871 (1969) (the substantial factor that is one of significance
rather than of largeness, smallness, or quantum).
82. See Byrd, supra note 36, at 266.
83. The terms "material element" and "substantial factor" are considered synonymous by
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1911.84 Application of the test by the Supreme Court of Minnesota 5s led to its
subsequent adoption by the American Law Institute in 1934,86 not only as a
test of factual causation, but also to synthesize other policy considerations which
limit liability after causation in fact has been established.8 7 However, using the
words "substantial factor" to define the policy considerations, resulted in confusion because those questions are not related to cause in fact.8 8 Consequently,
several states retreated from that kind of overly broad usage of the test and
limited application to questions of cause in fact alone.8 9 In light of the resulting
disparity, the 1948 revision of the Restatement of Torts also restricted the use
of the test to factual causation.9 0
The substantial factor test may be stated as follows:
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if:
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and
(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of
the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm.9 1
This is not so much a test as a tautology.9 2 The term "substantial factor" has
been deemed sufficiently intelligible to laymen to serve as an adequate guide in
instructing a jury while avoiding reduction of the test of cause in fact to an
undesirably low level of analytic evaluation93 This test, which has been adopted
the courts. While sometimes used separately, they are usually seen together. Compare Loftin
v. Wilson, 67 So. 2d 185, 191 (Fla. 1953) ("material and substantial factor") with Greene v.
Flowelling, 366 So. 2d 777, 781 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1979) ("substantial factor" alone)
84. See Smith, supra note 45, at 309. Judge Jeremiah Smith proposed the term in a
statement of a problem and general rule as follows: "Problem -What constitutes such a
relation of cause and effect between defendant's tort and plaintiff's damage as is sufficient to
maintain an action of tort? General Rule - Defendant's tort must have been a substantial
factor in producing the damage complained of." Id.
85. Minnesota was the first state to adopt the substantial factor test. See, e.g., Anderson
v. Minneapolis St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920); Holmberg v. Villaume,
158 Minn. 442, 197 N.W. 849 (1924); Borsheim v. Great Northern Ry., 149 Minn. 210, 183
N.W. 519 (1921).
86. See RESTATEMENT (FtrsT) oF TORTS § 431 (1934). Substantial factor language was also
used in Justice Andrew's dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 347, 162 N.E.
99, 104 (N.Y. 1928).
87. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 432 (1934).
88. See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
89. Minnesota was the leader in this limitation. See Seward v. Minnesota St. R. Co., 222
Minn. 454, 25 N.W.2d 221 (1946).
90. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 433 (1965). See also F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS
1161 (1956) where the authors state that "substantial factor" is not appropriate to describe
legal considerations, but that where defendant's conduct is a substantial factor, recovery should
not be denied because of any further considerations of cause in fact.
91. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 431 (1965). Statement (b), concerning rules of law
which release the defendant from liability in some situations, is not commonly used by courts
in defining the test. Most jurisdictions which have adopted the test, however, do adhere to the
Restatement's position. See note 94 infra.
92. Morris, On the Teaching of Legal Cause, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 1087, 1100 (1939). Professor Morris called the test a tautology because it makes legal cause a test of legal cause which begs the question.
93. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 240. See also Weinrib, supra note 19, at 523. Weinrib
holds that the tautology reference of Morris, see note 92 supra, may merely indicate that the
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in a number of states,9 4 is considered an improvement 5 over the "but for" test,
functioning adequately not only in situations of concurrent causes, but also in
those circumstances where a similar result would have occurred without the
defendant's acts. 96 Furthermore, the test successfully operates where one of two
or more defendants has made a clear but insignificant contribution to the
plaintiffs injury97 If the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in causing
the plaintif's loss, he will not be absolved from liability merely because other
causes 96 have contributed to the result.9 9 As with all questions of cause in fact,
whether a defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in causing the harm is a
question for the jury.100

Most tort cases, however, do not involve independent multiple causes, each
sufficient to inflict the harm to the plaintiff. 101 Accordingly, the substantial
1 2
factor and "but for" tests will achieve the same result in the majority of cases.'

Except for situations involving concurrent, alternative, or successive causes, no
case has been found where the defendant's conduct could be called a substantial
factor when the injury would have occurred but for the defendant's conduct. 03
As applied to factual causation, however, the substantial factor test is capable of

resolving more cases than the "but for" test'04 and is a more satisfactory solution to questions of cause in fact05
The substantial factor analysis has received criticism. First, some contend
inquiry has reached a minimum level of evaluation of cause in fact. But see H. HART &
A. HONOPE, supra note 27, at 216 (where a strong objection is made to the term "substantial
factor" on the grounds that it is undefinable).
94. See generally Aggregate Limestone Co. v. Robison, 276 Ala. 338, 340, 161 So. 2d 820,
822 (1964); Barclay Kitchen, Inc. v. California Bank, 208 Cal. App. 2d 347, 354, 25 Cal. Rptr.
383, 387 (2d D.C.A. 1962); Hook v. Lakeside Park Co., 142 Colo. 277, 284, 351 P.2d 261, 266
(1960); Mitchell v. Branch, 45 Haw. 128, 133, 363 P.2d 969, 973 (1961); Huey v. Milligan, 242
Ind. 93, 99, 175 N.E.2d 698, 703 (1961); Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. New Orleans Co. v. American Bev. Co., 242 La. 471, 476, 137 So. 2d 298, 302 (1962); Goudy v. State, 203 Miss. 366, 868, 35
So. 2d 308, 809 (1948); Hildreth v. Key, 341 S.W.2d 601, 607 (Mo. 1960); Maxfield v. Maxfield,
102 N.H. 101, 105, 151 A.2d 226, 230 (1959); Rapport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 198, 156 A.2d 1,
9 (1959); Ortega v. Texas-New Mexico Ry. Co., 70 N.M. 58, 62, 370 P.2d 201, 204 (1962);
Dunham v. Canisteo, 303 N.Y. 498, 504, 104 N.E2d 872, 878 (1952); Sworden v. Gross, 243 Or.
83, 85, 409 P.2d 897, 898 (1966); Majors v. Broadhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 271, 205 A.2d 873,
877 (1965); Lancaster v. Montesi, 216 Tenn. 50, 390 S.W.2d 217, 221 (1965); Parks v. Hines,
814 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex. Ct. App. 1958); Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp. v. Royal
Transit Co., 29 Wis. 2d 620, 625, 139 N.W.2d 595,599 (1966).
95. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 24.
96. See note 64 and accompanying text, supra. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) Or TORTS
§ 432, Comment a (1965).
97. See R.SrATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 431, Comment b (1965).
98. Id. § 432, Comments a-d. Other causes include natural occurrences and the innocent
or tortious conduct of third persons.
99.

Id.

100. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 23. See also text accompanying note 50 supra.
101. See W. PROSSER, supranote 1, at 240.
102. Id.

103. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. McCleery, 418 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. 1967).
104. See Interview, supranote 11.
105. See Weinrib, supra note 19, at 522.
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"substantial factor" is difficult to define. 10 6 This criticism has not proved con-

vincing,107 the term being recently praised for its simplicitylos Second, difficulty
with the test is encountered when one of two concurrent or successive causes is
innocent, yet, the non-tortious act may still be found a substantial factor in
causing the injury.109 This difficulty is similar to that inherent in the "but for"
test, and a valid criticism.'1° Thus, situations do arise in which the test is of
little or no value. Nevertheless, the substantial factor test is the best method
available by which the jury may decide factually whether the defendant's conduct is a cause of the plaintiff's injury."'
The Conflict in Florida
Florida courts historically applied the "but for" test to determine cause in
fact.1 2 The definition of proximate cause'"3 traditionally utilized in Florida is
stated as follows: "To constitute proximate cause, there must be such a natural,
direct and continuous sequence between the negligent act and the injury that
it can be reasonably said that but for the act the injury would not have occurred".114 While the Florida supreme court has spoken in favor of the substantial factor test,1 5 some courts still apply the "but for" test." 6 There remains some uncertainty as to whether the substantial factor test accurately states
the law of Florida.
In Jackson v. Florida Weathermakers, Inc.," 7 a shopper was injured in a
meat market by a falling ceiling tile negligently installed by the workmen of a
subcontractor. The shopper brought a negligence action against the subcontrac106. See, e.g., H. HART & A. HONORE, supra note 27, at 216; Peaslee, supra note 31, at
1128. Judge Peaslee noted that such factors as multiple causes, results of extraordinary character and lapse of time are important considerations not addressed by simply defining the
term. This view, however, ignores the bifurcated nature of proximate cause. See note 27 supra.
107. See, e.g., L. GREENE, supra note 21, at 132. Greene counters the argument that the
term is undefinable by saying that the word "reasonable" is no more subject to definition than
"substantial factor," but that this has not prevented its almost universal use in posing
questions to juries.
108. See note 198 and accompanying text, infra.
109. See Peaslee, supra note 31, at 1130.
110. Id. at 1129.
Ill. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 26.
112. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Jones, 138 Fla. 746, 749, 190 So. 26, 27 (1939) (using the
classic "but for" definition); Woodbury v. Tampa Water Works, 57 Fla. 243, 249, 49 So. 556,
559 (1909) (using "but for" definition); Lingefelt v. Hanner, 125 So. 2d 325, 326 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1960) (citing Pope); Pope v. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., 120 So. 2d 227, 229 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1960) (citing Tampa Electric).
113. Here the term is used in the sense of cause in fact. See text accompanying note 29
supra.
114. Sardell v. Malanio, 202 So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla. 1967). See also Pope v. Pinkerton-Hays
Lumber Co., 120 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1960) (using the same definition), aff'd, 127 So. 2d
441, 443 (Fla. 1961) (definition referred to as a "learned and accurate statement of the law of
proximate cause"). This has been referred to as the classic definition of proximate cause. See
Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N.Y. 73, 99, 52 N.E. 679, 688 (1899).
115. See note 129 and accompanying text, infra.
116. See cases cited notes 136-137 infra.
117. 55 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1951).
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tor and the owner, claiming the owner had failed to provide a safe place to shop.
The owner argued that the plaintiff had the burden to prove the owner's act
or omission the sole proximate cause of the injury. 118 The Florida supreme
court held that if the owner's failure to provide the plaintiff with a safe place
to shop was an independent tortious act and a substantial factor in causing the
plaintiff's injury, the owner would be liable. 1 9
The supreme court reaffirmed support for the substantial factor test in
Loftin v. Wilson,120 a case in which a railroad trainman was injured when the
train on which he was riding collided with a truck owned by a construction
company. The injured trainman brought a negligence action joining both the
truck driver and train engineer as defendants.12, After a verdict for the plaintiff,
the railroad appealed, arguing that liability on its part had not been dearly
shown. The court responded that a defendant's conduct in an action for personal injuries is considered a cause of the event if it was a material and substantial factor in the resulting injury.122
Despite earlier acceptance, the substantial factor test suffered a setback in
Pope v. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co.1 23 An employee of the defendant contractor negligently severed telephone lines to the plaintiff's lumber yard with a
bulldozer. When a fire broke out in the lumber yard, the plaintiff was unable
to contact the fire department by telephone. He sued the contractor, claiming
that greater damage had resulted due to the contractor's acts. The First District
Court of Appeal, in an exhaustive discussion of proximate cause,12 4 stated that
the substantial factor test had not previously been used by Florida courts. 2 5
Instead, the court held the "but for" test the proper statement of the law of
factual causation in Florida.26 Since the lower court reached a proper result in
finding the defendant contractor's conduct was causally connected but too
remote to impose liability, the supreme court affirmed the decision without
118.

Rejecting this argument, the court, citing Crenshaw Bros. Produce Co. v. Harper, 192

Fla. 27, 34, 194 So. 353, 359 (1940), held that if an injury is caused by the concurring negligence
of two or more parties, each of them is liable to the injured party to the same extent as
though it had been caused by his negligence alone. 55 So. 2d at 577.
119. 55 So. 2d at 577, 578. The case was remanded for a second trial in accordance with

the opinion. Id. at 578.
120. 67 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1953).
121. Id. at 187. The claim against the railroad was made under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act, while the claim against the construction company was in common law negligence.
122. Id. at 191. The case was remanded to determine the issue of the railroad's liability.
123. 120 So. 2d 227 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1960).
124. Id. at 229-31. This opinion written by Judge Wigginton, is one of the best known
and most frequently cited discussions of proximate cause found in Florida case law. See, e.g.,
City of St. Petersburg v. Shannon, 156 So. 2d 870, 871 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1963) ("the original
Pope decision by Judge Wigginton has already become entrenched in Florida jurisprudence as
a leading authority on the subject of proximate causation').
125. 120 So. 2d at 229 n.7. The decision overlooked the Jackson and Loftin decisions.
126. Id. at 229, 230 (citing Seaboard Airline Ry. Co. v. Mullin, 70 Fla. 450, 454, 70 So. 467,
470 (1915) (proximate cause produces the injury in continuous sequence, without which the

injury would not have occurred) and Woodbury v. Tampa Water Works, 57 Fla. 243, 247, 49
So. 556, 559 (1909) (negligence is the proximate cause of an injury when in ordinary, natural
sequence it causes the injury without an intervening independent efficient cause)).
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mention of the incorrect treatment of the substantial factor test. 127 This oversight led other appellate courts to hold the Pope analysis correct in every re28
spect and that the substantial factor test had not been adopted in Florida.1
The substantial factor test, however, again received supreme court approval
in Asgrow-Kilgore v. Mulford Hickerson Corp.129 In that case, the defendant
used a helicopter to spray herbicide in drainage canals, and the spray drifted
onto the plaintiff's field of caladium plants. Claiming a reduced crop yield as a
result of the spray, the plaintiff brought an action for damages. 30 The trial
court found in favor of the defendant and held the plaintiff had failed to prove
the defendant's negligence a proximate cause of the damage to the plants. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal applied the "but for" test and reversed.13 ' The
case was remanded with instructions to assess damages in favor of the plain13
tiff.132 On appeal, the supreme court 3 held that liability should be imposed
when a causal connection is proved to be a material and substantial factor in
bringing about the injury.134 Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Dekle
emphasized that "[i]t is this test which a trial court applies to the facts".1s5
The court appears to have unequivocally adopted the substantial factor test.
Despite supreme court approval of the substantial factor test, conflict remains among the district courts of appeal. The First District, in which the Pope
decision was written, has consistently adhered to the "but for" test. 30 Likewise,
the Third District has yet to utilize the substantial factor test.13 7 On the other
127. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co. v. Pope, 127 So. 2d 441, 443 (Fla. 1961). The fire that
burned the lumber company was held to be an intervening cause. This was a question of law
and policy or proximate cause, see text accompanying note 25 supra, and both the "but for"
and substantial factor tests would have been immaterial. The most unfortunate aspect of the
affirmance, however, is that the court overlooked the incorrect statement by the First District
Court of Appeal regarding the substantial factor test.
128. See, e.g., Florida Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. Exchange Bank of St. Augustine, 277
So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1973) (citing Pope as a thorough analysis of proximate cause);
City of St. Petersburg v. Shannon, 156 So. 2d 870, 871 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1963).
129. 301 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1974). The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions was unaware of this case prior to June 1979. Interview, supra note 11.
130. 301 So. 2d at 442. This was an issue of concurrent causes involving the effect of the
defendant's spray and plant disease already on the plants. The question for the jury, therefore, was the extent, if any, to which the defendant's spray reduced crop yield.
131. Mulford Hickerson Corp. v. Asgrow-Kilgore Co., 282 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1973).
132. Id. at 23. The Fourth District Court of Appeal interpreted the trial court opinion as
holding that the spray was not the proximate cause. Id. at 22. Actually, the trial court had
held the spray was not a proximate cause of the damage. See id. at 20.
133. Asgrow-Kilgore Co. v. Mulford Hickerson Corp., 301 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1974).
134. Id. at 444. The supreme court cited Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1953) as
authority for the substantial factor test.
135. 301 So. 2d at 445. The court further said that in applying this standard, if damages
have been suffered, lack of precise proof as to the exact amount will not be fatal so long as
the proof supports the loss determined by the jury and is not speculative. Id.
136. Here the influence of Judge Wigginton, author of that opinion, can be seen. See, e.g.,
Bryant v. Jax Liquors, 352 So. 2d 542, 544 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977) (applied "but for" test, citing
Pope); Broome v. Budget Rent-A-Car of Jax, Inc., 182 So. 2d 26, 29 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1966)
(citing Pope definition of proximate cause); Smith v. City Prods. Corp., 147 So. 2d 590, 592
(Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1962) (citing Pope definition of proximate cause).
137. See, e.g., Lingefelt v. Hammer, 125 So. 2d 325, 326 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1960) (citing Pope
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hand, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, after being reversed in AsgrowKilgore, has adopted the substantial factor test, 138 and the Second District has
applied the test as well.139 The current inconsistency in the use of the tests
appears a direct result of the supreme court opinion in Asgrow-Kilgore. 40 The
First and Third District Courts of Appeal, in adhering to the traditional definition, incorrectly state the present law of factual causation in Florida.
A notable feature common to cases approving the substantial factor test is
the presence of concurrent causes.' 41 In these situations, the substantial factor
test has a demonstrable superiority to the "but for" test. 4 2 For example, in the
Pope case, the court found the test of factual causation irrelevant, holding the
fire which burned the lumber yard an unforeseeable intervening cause.' 43 However, if the fire had been found a proximate cause, the choice of cause in fact
tests would have been significant. Under the "but for" test, the contractor
could have argued that withoift his negligence the fire damage would have
occurred anyway, and that liability should not be imposed. 44 Using the substantial factor test, the jury could find that severing the telephone line contributed significantly to the damage caused by the fire,' 4" and therefore the
contractor would be liable. Likewise, in Jackson, the "but for" test alone would
have enabled the store owner to argue that he should escape liability because
but for his conduct, the injury would have occurred anyway. 4" However, if the
jury found the owner's negligence in failing to provide a safe place to shop, a
47
substantial factor in causing the injury, the owner could be held responsible.
In Asgrow-Kilgore, the "but for" test would have found the herbicide to be a
cause in fact of the crop damage even if it made an insignificant contribution to
the loss.' 48 Even if the difference in loss would have been de minimus but for
definition of proximate cause). This case was prior to the supreme court's use of the sub-

stantial factor test in Asgrow-Kilgore, and no Third District cases stating a test of factual
causation were found subsequent to the Asgrow-Kilgore decision. Thus, it cannot be said with
certainty that the Third District will continue to apply the "but for" test.
188. See, e.g., Little v. Miller, 311 So. 2d 116, 118 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975) (any negligence
that substantially contributed to the injury should not be excused).
139. See, e.g., Greene v. Flewelling, 366 So. 2d 377, 381 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1979) (plaintiff
must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that the conduct
of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the result).
140. Both the Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal changed to the substantial
factor test after Asgrow-Kilgore, see notes 138-139 supra, while the First District Court of
Appeal has continued to adhere to the "but for" test, See note 136 supra.
141. See, e.g., Asgrow-Kilgore Co. v. Mulford Hickerson Corp., 301 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla.
1974) (herbicide and plant disease); Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So. 2d 185, 187 (Fla. 1953) (accident
involving truck and train); Jackson v. Florida Weathermakers, Inc., 55 So. 2d 575, 576 (Fla.
1951) (concurring negligence of market owner and subcontractor); Greene v. Flewelling, 366
So. 2d 777, 779 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1979) (concurring negligence of two drivers); Little v. Miller,
311 So. 2d 116, 117 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975) (concurring negligence of two drivers).
142. See text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
143. See note 23 and accompanying text, supra.
144. See note 92 and accompanying text, supra.
145. See note 96 and accompanying text, supra.
146. See note 60 and accompanying text, supra.
147. See note 96 and accompanying text, supra.
148. See note 56 and accompanying text, supra.
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the herbicide, the identical harm would not have resulted. In contrast, the
49
substantial factor test eliminates insignificant contributions.
The more accurate statement of the present state of the law of causation in
Florida, therefore, is that the supreme court has adopted the substantial factor
test in cases of concurrent causes. 50 The two causation tests achieve the same
result in cases involving single causes or individually insufficient causal factors.151 In addition, the same standard or test is applied to both single and
multiple causes, 152 therefore adoption of the substantial factor test in cases of
concurring causes also reasonably indicates adoption of this test in cases of
single or dependent insufficient causes. The same result is reached, whichever
test is applied in these cases.' 5 3 Thus, shifting between the two tests to accommodate either single and individually insufficient causes or multiple, individually sufficient causes serves only to confuse both judge and jury.
STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Florida's adoption of standard jury instructions154 reflects the modern
trend toward the development and use of standard instructions.' 55 In a given
jurisdiction, the use of standard instructions by the trial judge may be either
mandatory or advisory,156 depending on the goals of the charges. 57 Two basic
approaches have been taken to the use of standardized instructions, as exemplified by California s8 and Illinois.' 59
California developed standard instructions to increase efficiency by reducing
the time spent in trial preparation 16 and has been the leader in advocating
advisory or recommended use of standard instructions.161 Since the focus of
149. See note 82 and accompanying text, supra.
150. There are no cases in which the substantial factor test was applied to single or
dependent individually insufficient causes. See note 53 and accompanying text, supra.

151.

See text accompanying note 102 supra.

152.

See note 194 and accompanying text, infra.

158.
154.
155.

See note 102 and accompanying text, supra.
In re Standard Jury Instructions, 198 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1967).
See R. NIp-LAN, supra note 6, at 4.

156. See Note, Requirements Regarding Utilization of Standard Jury Instructions, 22
WAYNE L. REV. 871, 878 (1976). In jurisdictions with mandatory instructions, the sponsor has

always been the supreme court. In advisory jurisdictions, the sponsor has usually been the
state bar association, but other groups such as judges' associations have sponsored some advisory instructions. See Alfini, supra note 6, at 24.
157. Standard jury instructions are usually designed to satisfy six basic goals: making
charges impartial, uniform treatment of cases, saving time in the trial court, reducing the
appellate case load, accurately stating the law, and improving juror comprehension. See Note,
PatternJury Instructions,40 N.D.L. REV. 164, 165 (1964); R. NIELAND, supra note 6, at 13.
158.

CALIFORNIA JURY INsTRUCTIONS, CIVIL (6th ed. 1977).

159. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL (1961). See notes 165-166 and accompanying text, infra.
160. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL vii (6th ed. 1977).

161. For example, California, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, New York, Utah, Washington, and
Wisconsin do not mandate use of standard instructions by trial judges. For a complete list of
mandatory and advisory jurisdictions, see Alfini, supra note 6, at 25. The federal standard in-

structions are also advisory. See 1 FEDERAL
ed. 1977).

JURY

PRACTICE

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

AND

INSTRUCTIONS

§

8.03, 246 (3d

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 5
FLORIDA JURY INSTRUCTIONS

1980]

standardization was not on any particular deficiency in the instruction system,
mandatory use of the standard instructions was not necessary to correct any
specific abuse. 162 Jurisdictions adopting the California approach have recognized that the ultimate responsibility for correctly and accurately charging the
jury belongs to the trial court, and while use of the instructions is often highly
64
recommended, 16 3 discretion is left with the judge.
Taking a different approach, the Illinois Judicial Conference realized that
standard jury instructions could be used to correct an instructional system
plagued with problems 65 and described as "nonfunctional".66 Prior to standardization, reversals due to instructional error constituted over one third of the
jury cases appealed. 67 Therefore, Illinois found mandatory use of the standard
instructions necessary to correct the abuses of the system. 68 Other jurisdictions
with similar problems soon followed. 169 Regardless of the approach, standard
instructions have been well received 17o due to the considerable advantages they
offer. 17 Despite some criticism of the system, 172 most jurisdictions have adopted
162. See Note, supra note 156, at 874.
163.

See, e.g., FLORmA STANDARD JURY INSrRUcriONS vi (1967). In Florida the trial judge

may modify the standard instructions if he determines them to be inadequate or erroneous,
but a statement must be made on the record or in a separate order setting forth the legal
basis of his determination. The trial judge is also requested to notify the Florida Bar of any
instructions thought to be in error. See Lynch v. McGoveru, 270 So. 2d 770, 771 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1973) (if standard instruction is inadequate, trial judge may amend them or give some other
instruction).
164. See, e.g., NEw YoRK PArERN JURY INsTRUcriONS xi (2d ed. 1974). The New York
charges are considered guides and the trial judge does not have to use them. See Ellis v.
Dichiara, 38 A.D.2d 780, 781, 328 N.Y.S.2d 36, 37 (App. Div. 1972); CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCrIoNs, Crvi vii (6th ed. 1977).

165. See Note, supra note 156, at 874. Judicial rule entitled each litigant to have the jury
instructed on his theory of the case if there was a supporting evidentiary base. This resulted
in jury charges containing a multitude of separate instructions -sometimes as many as fifty.
Encouraged by this system, counsel made partisan weapons out of instructions by submitting
slanted and prolific jury charges strongly favoring their case.
166. See Wright, Adequacy of Instructions to the Jury, 53 MICH. L. Rv. 505, 515 (1955).
The system was nonfunctional in the sense that the judge was essentially arguing all sides of
the case to the jury rather than instructing the jury on the applicable law.
167. See Note, supra note 156, at 874.
168. See R. NmAND, supra note 6, at 9. Nieland believes a more logical way of correcting
these problems would have been to amend the rules of civil procedure, but similar previous
attempts had failed. Id.
169. For example, Arkansas, Colorado, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, and New Mexico
use mandatory instructions. See Alfini, supra note 6, at 25. Interestingly, Florida, which uses
the advisory approach, used the mandatory Illinois instructions as a guide for developing its
standard instructions. See FLORIDA STANDARD JuRY INSTRUCTIONS iX (1967).
170. See note 6 and accompanying text, supra.
171. Advantages include accuracy, appellate impact, uniformity, impartiality, and increased juror comprehension. See R. NmLAND, supra note 6, at 13-22.
172. Criticisms include complaints that standard jury instructions are too abstract, discourage flexibility, and are too slanted to one side. See, e.g., Close, Theory and Practice of
Standardized Jury Instructions, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 490, 491 (1964); Winslow, The Instruction
Ritual, 13 HASTINGs L.J. 456, 458-60 (1962); Note, Pattern Jury Instructions,40 N.D.L. Rv.
164, 168 (1964). See also Young v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 333 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla. Ist D.C.A.

1976) (litigant claiming instruction too abstract); Wackenhut Corp. v. Greene, 228 So. 2d 431,
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73

them.
In 1962, the Supreme Court of Florida established the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions for the study and development of a workable program. 7 4 The committee was to formulate instructions which would express the applicable issues and legal principles briefly and in simple, understandable language, without argument, unnecessary repetition, or reliance on
negative charges. 7 5 The committee completed the task in 1967, and the supreme
court approved the FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, authorizing their

76
publication by the Florida Bar, that same year.'
Florida, like California, uses the nonmandatory or recommended standard
in applying civil jury instructions. 7 7 The implementing order recommends
but does not require the standard instructions to be used by trial judges.' 8
However, to the extent that the standard instructions are applicable, appellate
courts have found error where they were not given.' 79 While the ultimate decision of the content of the charge remains within the discretion of the trial
judge, it is still subject to the litigants' right to accurate jury instructions based
on currently valid law. 80 The requirement of accuracy has given rise to a conflict in the area of proximate or legal cause.

STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR PROXIMATE CAUSE

Considering the different approaches jurisdictions take to proximate cause' s '

433 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1970) (litigant, who was claiming instruction on legal cause was slanted,
requested instruction which the court said was too abstract).
173. See note 6 supra.
174. See FLORiDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUcrIONS ix (1967).
175. Id.
176. See In re Standard Jury Instructions, 198 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1967). The court continued
the committee so that it could review errors and inaccuracies and recommend amendments as
experience proved them necessary. The instructions have been amended twice to date. For the
various amendments, see In re Standard Jury Instructions, 290 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1974); In re
Standard Jury Instructions, 233 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1970).
177. See note 169 supra.
178. In re Standard Jury Instructions, 198 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1967). See also Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Fruchter, 283 So. 2d 36, 37 (Fla. 1973) (while standard instructions are generally to be
followed where applicable, they are not intended to change the substantive law).
179. See, e.g., Clooney v. Geeting, 352 So. 2d 1216, 1219 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977) (new trial
awarded for failure to give standard instruction on concurring cause); Little v. Miller, 311 So.
2d 116, 118 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975) (error to refuse standard instruction on concurring cause);
Ruiz v. Cold Storage & Insulation Contractors, Inc., 306 So. 2d 153, 155 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1975)
(new trial awarded for failure to give standard instruction on concurring cause). For a statement on the effect of Ruiz, see Tanen, Civil Procedure, 31 U. MIAMi L. REv. 868, 892 (1977).
180. See generally Schweikert v. Palm Beach Speedway, 100 So. 2d 804, 806 (Fla. 1958)
(failure of trial judge to lay down standards for the jury to follow contitutes reversible error);
Holley v. Kelley, 91 So. 2d 862, 864 (Fla. 1957) (failure to instruct on applicable law is error);
Ruiz v. Cold Storage & Insulation Contractors, Inc., 306 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1975)
(litigants have right to jury instructions on applicable law); Lynch v. McGovern, 270 So. 2d
770, 771 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1973) (trial court is required to instruct jury regarding law applicable to the facts).
181. See notes 42, 94 and accompanying text, supra.
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and to standard jury instructions,' s2 there appears an unsurprising variance
among them when the two concepts are combined. 83 The primary goal of
standard jury instructions on proximate cause has been to attain a concise
statement of the law in understandable language. 84 Therefore, the resulting
instructions depend on the objectives sought 8 5 and the law of a given jurisdic8
tion.18 6 While a number of states have adopted the substantial factor test,' '
88
most of them, including Florida, have not yet incorporated that test in their
standard instructions. 189 A comparison of the Florida instructions on legal
cause with those of several jurisdictions which use the substantial factor test
will aid in determining what changes are needed in the Florida instructions.
The Florida instructions on legal cause consist of three sequential charges
which the trial judge may use according to the needs of a particular case. 90
The first charge, legal cause generally, uses the classic "but for" definition of
cause in fact as the statement of Florida law. 91 This charge is to be given in
all negligence cases, 92 and is the focal point of the conflict. The second charge,
concurring causes, 9 3 is to be given when the court considers it necessary. How182. See notes 157-158 and accompanying text, supra.
183. A given jurisdiction may use either the "but for" or substantial factor test, and
either mandatory or advisory standard jury instructions. In addition, there is variation in the
number of charges used to instruct the jury on the concept of proximate cause. See, e.g.,
ARxANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AMI 501-03 (2d ed. 1974) (using "but for" test and three
instructions); CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUcTIONS, CIvIL BAJI 3.75-.80 (6th ed. 1977) (using both
tests alternatively with six charges); ALABAMA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL APJI 33.00-.01

(1974) (using "but for" test with two charges).
184. See Davidson, Pattern Jury Instructions, 45 ILL. B.J. 406, 407 (1957). Those who
favor standard jury instructions maintain that if jurors are accurately instructed on the law,
there will be fewer reversals on appeal for instructional error.
185. See note 157 supra.
186. See notes 42, 94 supra.
187. See note 94 supra.
188. See

FLORiRA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS 5.1(a)-(c)

(1967). For cases applying the

"but for" test, see note 141 supra.
189. See, e.g., ALABAMA PATERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL APJI 33.00 (1974) (using "but
for" test); COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL 9:24 (1969) (using "but for" test). For cases

using the substantial factor test in these jurisdictions, see note 94 supra.
190. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS 5.1(a)-(c) (1967). The Florida instructions are
published in a looseleaf binder in order that the trial judge may mark the appropriate sections
and read them directly from the book. The instructions on legal cause are sequential in instruction 5.1, and the judge can read straight through them if they are all applicable. In
ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, supra note 159, by contrast, the proximate cause
instructions are located throughout a hardbound volume.
191. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS 5.1(a) (1967): "Negligence is a legal cause of
(loss) (injury) (or) (damage) if it directly and in natural and continous sequence produces or
contributes substantially to producing such (loss) (injury) (or) (damage), so that it can
reasonably be said that, but for the negligence, the (loss) (injury) (or) (damage) would not
have occurred." See also Pope v. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., 120 So. 2d 441, 443 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1960), the case that led the committee to retain the "but for" test. See text accompanying notes 123-128 supra.
192. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS 5.1(a) Note on Use (1967). The charge is used
not only to determine the defendant's liability, but also the plaintiff's comparative negligence.
193. Id. at 5.1(b). "In order to be regarded as a legal cause of (loss) (injury) (or) (damage),
negligence need not be the only cause. Negligence may be a cause of (loss) (injury) (or)

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol32/iss2/5

20

Voght:
Testof Causation and the Florida Jury Instructions--A Current Con
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. XXXII

ever, the instruction does not set forth any additional standard for the jury to
consider in determining whether the defendant's conduct was a legal cause of
the injury. 9 4 The final instruction, intervening causes, 195 is to be given in
cases in which the court concludes that a jury question exists as to the presence
19 6
The term "substantially" is used a number
and effect of an intervening cause.
of times in the three charges, but not as an adoption of the substantial factor
test. 1 97 Instead, the use of the term is utilized to describe the extent of contribution or influence that negligence must have made to be considered a legal

cause of an injury.198 The Florida instructions do not accurately state the law
of factual causation as set forth in Asgrow-Kilgore.
99
give perhaps the most complete
In comparison, the California instructions
treatment of proximate cause, with six instructions for the trial judge's selection.200 As in Florida, doubt existed as to whether the substantial factor test

had been adopted in California, 20, and the committee provided alternative
(damage) even though it operates in combination with (the act of another) (some natural
cause) (or) some other cause if such other cause occurs at the same time as the negligence and
if the negligence contributes substantially to producing such (loss) (injury) (or) (damage." Id.
194. Id. Note on Use. See also Little v. Miller, 311 So. 2d 116, 119 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975)
(5.1(b) sets forth no further standard for the jury to consider). Instruction 5.1(b) only sets
forth the Florida law that a defendant is not excused from liability by reason of a concurring
cause contributing to the same damage. For a statement of this rule, see Crenshaw Bros.
Produce v. Harper, 142 Fla. 27, 34, 194 So. 2d 353, 359 (1940).
195. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS 5.1(c) (1967): "[In order to be regarded as a
legal cause of (loss) (injury) (or) (damage), negligence need not be its only cause.] Negligence
may also be a cause of (loss) (injury) (or) (damage) even though it operates in combination
with (the act of another) (or) some other cause occurring after the negligence occurs if
negligence contributes substantially to producing such (loss) (injury) or such other cause was
itself reasonably foreseeable and the (damage) or the resulting (loss) (injury) (or) (damage)
was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negligence and the negligence contributes
substantially to producing it]." The bracketed first sentence is not used if this charge is
preceded by the charge on concurring cause.
196. Id. at Note on Use. See also Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. McKinney, 237 So. 2d 176
(Fla. 1970) (trial court was correct in giving standard instruction on legal cause and refusing
requested instruction on intervening cause).
197. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS 5.1(C) Comment a (1967). See also 187 J. AFTL
8 (1978) where the editors told the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions
that the "but for" test should be eliminated. The committee replied that it would have agreed
except that it felt bound to include the "but for" test in light of Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co.
v. Pope, 127 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1961), where the supreme court affirmed the lower court's use of
the "but for" test.
198. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS 5.1(C) Comment a (1967). The committee also
felt that the term had an acceptable common meaning.
199. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL (6th ed. 1977).
200. See CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL BAJI 3.75-.80.
201. Id. at 3.75, Comment at 102, 3.76, Comment at 103. The committee noted, however,
there was precedent for the substantial factor test in California. See, e.g., Vesely v. Sager, 5
Cal. 3d 153, 160, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 630, 486 P.2d 151, 158 (1971) (actor may be liable if his
negligence is a substantial factor); Benton v. Sloxx, 38 Cal. 2d 399, 402, 240 P.2d 575, 578
(1952) (defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in bringing the injuries about); Barclay
Kitchen, Inc. v. California Bank, 208 Cal. App. 2d 347, 351, 25 Cal. Rptr. 383, 387 (2d D.C.A.
1962) (if defendant's act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the result, it
will be regarded as a cause in fact).
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instructions to allow use of either the "but for" or substantial factor test.2 2 For
situations in which multiple or concurrent causes exist, California has four
instructions.203 The need for this unusually large number of instructions reflects the retention of the "but for" test, as an additional instruction on concurrent causes must provide for situations in which the test fails to function
properly.204 Even though the trial judge decides which alternative will be used
and the jury hears only those chosen instructions, a lack of uniformity could
still result, for the same statement 6f the law of factual causation may not be
given in all cases. 20 5 Furthermore, California's dual system causes difficulty in
accurately stating the lawof the state. 200 The Florida committee, however,
should in light of Asgrow-Kilgore207 have little doubt as to the appropriate test
of factual causation. 05 While California's instructions are part of the growing
trend toward the substantial factor test, the retention of both tests would be
inappropriate in Florida.
In contrast, the standard instructions for federal courts offer no alternative
to the basic cause in fact instruction, and unequivocally apply the substantial
factor test.209 In the federal instructions,210 the basic, or definitional instruction
includes a statement concerning intervening causes211 that necessitates only one
202.

CArORNIA JuRY INSTRUanONS, CrWL BAJI 3.75-.76 (6th ed. 1977). BAJI 3.75 uses the

"but for" test while BAJI 3.76 uses the substantial factor test. For judicial approval of use.of
the term "legal cause," see McEnvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Cal. 2d 295, 297, 195 P.2d

783, 785 (1948).
203. See CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCIONS, CrVIL BAJI 3.77-.80 (6th ed. 1977).
204. Id. at 3.78, Concurring Causes- Either Cause Alone Sufficient. This instruction is to
be used only where the injury would have resulted from either of two causes, thus making the
"but for" rule of BAJI 3.75 inapplicable. In such cases, BAJI 3.78 is used in place of BAJI
3.75. See, e.g., Thomsen v. Rexall Drug & Chem. Co., 235 Cal. App. 2d 775, 780, 45 Cal. Rptr.
642, 647 (1st D.C.A. 1965) (defendant's conduct is a cause of an event if it was a material
element and substantial factor in bringing it about).
205. See note 157 supra.
206. See notes 184, 201 and accompanying text, supra. In no jurisdiction does the highest
court recognize the existence of both tests of causation under the same facts. Without judicial
approval, the presence of alternative instructions indicates that one of the two instructions
inaccurately states the law.
207. Asgrow-Kilgore Co. v. Mulford Hickerson Corp., 301 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1974).
208. See note 135 and accompanying text, supra.
209. See FEnEAL JuRY PRACTICE AND INsTRUCTIONs § 80.18 (3d ed. 1977). "An injury or
damage is proximately caused by an act, or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the
evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or
actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct
result or a xeasonably probable consequence of the act or omission." Id. For federal court
cases applying the substantial factor test, see Moses v. Central La. Elec. Co., 324 F.2d 69, 73
(5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 942 (1964); United States v. Marshall, 230 F.2d 183,
190-93 (9th Cir. 1956).
210.

FEDERAL JtY

PRAMcTIC

AND INSMUCTIONS (3d ed. 1977).

211. Id. § 80.18. After setting forth the substantial factor test of cause in fact, the instruction states, "and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a xeasonably
probable consequence of the act or ommission." The word "probable" interjects the concept
of foreseeability. See, e.g., Sharon v. Luten, 165 So. 2d 806, 809 (Fla. 1964) (natural and
probable consequences are those which a prudent person can be expected to anticipate). The
merger of foreseeability into cause in fact is similar to the North Carolina definition of
proximate cause. See Barefoot v. Joyner, 270 N.C. 388, 393, 154 S.E. 2d 543, 547 (1967)
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additional instruction on concurring causes.2 12 As in the Alabama civil standard
jury instructions,212 there are only two charges on proximate cause to be given
in any case.
214
The federal approach, however, has been rejected by most jurisdictions,
5
including Florida,21 because it interjects the complex and confusing concept
21 6
of foreseeability into the more basic determination of factual causal link.
21 7
the federal approach does
Although proximate cause is a bifurcated concept,
not treat the two concepts separately. In addition, the concept of intervening
causes and foreseeability is considered so confusing 21s that most jurisdictions do
not instruct the jury on this aspect of liability unless the evidence presented
so requires. 21 1 The federal courts do not use the substantial factor test in a
manner that should be recommended by the Florida committee.
The New York civil standard jury instructions 220 manage to avoid the failings of the federal charges. New York's basic definitional instruction applies
(proximate cause is a cause that produced the result in a continuous sequence and without
which it would not have occurred, and one from which any man of ordinary prudence could
have foreseen that such a result was probable).
212. Id. at § 80.19 (when there is more than one proximate cause). For a charge on substantial factor in a chain of causation, see Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 429 (2d
Cir. 1969) (jury should have been instructed that drug was a substantial factor in causing
blindness). Repeatedly instructing a jury that a defendant's negligence was the proximate
cause rather than merely a proximate cause has been held to be error. Carlsen v. Javurek,
526 F.2d 202, 209 (8th Cir. 1975) (jury instructed that each defendant must be shown to be
the proximate cause of a wrongful death). Accord, Asgrow-Kilgore v. Mulford Hickerson
Corp., 301 So. 2d 441, 444 (Fla. 1974).
213. ALABAMA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL (1974) at APJI 33.00-.01. The Alabama
charge on proximate cause, APJI 33.00, includes limits in its own definition by using the
language, "without the intervention of any new or independent cause." Customary definitions
of intervening cause were not considered to be enlightening to a jury. See APJI 33.02, Note on
Use.
214. See generally ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL AMI 5.01-.03 (2d ed. 1974);
COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL 9:24-:26 (1969); ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL
12.04-.05, 15.00 (2d ed. 1971); PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR KANSAS, CIVIL PIK 5.01-.03
(1966), all of which treat intervening cause separately.
215. See FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS 5.1(a)-(c) (1967).
216. See notes 26-30 and accompanying text, supra.
217. See note 27 and accompanying text, supra.
218. See note 25 and accompanying text, supra.
219. See, e.g., ALABAMA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, APJI 33.02 (1974), where a
recommendation is made that no instruction be given on intervening cause; ARKANSAS MODEL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL AMI 501 (2d ed. 1974), where there is no reference to intervening cause
in the definition of proximate cause. The Arkansas committee removed the phrase "unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause" from the definition of proximate cause since jurors were
never told what the phrase meant. Furthermore, the committee felt that no one could explain
the concept of intervening cause to a jury. See Drummond, Arkansas Model Jury Instructions,
20 ARK. L. REv. & B.A.J. 66, 69(1966). The Florida instruction on legal cause, note 191 supra,
also does not refer to foreseeability. In addition, the Florida instruction on intervening causes,
note 195 supra, does not use the term "intervening cause" within the body of the instruction.
As a result of this attitude toward intervening cause, most jurisdictions have elected to provide a separate charge on intervening cause to be used only when necessary. See, e.g., instructions cited in note 214 supra.

220.

NEw YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL
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the substantial factor test. 221 In cases of multiple or concurring causes, the
22 2
If
definitional instruction is followed by an instruction on concurring causes.

applicable, a third instruction may be given for intervening causes.222 Thus, in
this instructional system, three charges sufficiently and accurately state the law
of proximate cause without confusing issues of foreseeability or responsibility
with issues of cause in fact. Concise, compact, and accurate, the New York instructions on proximate cause provide a good substantive model for use of the

substantial factor test.
In summary, the above analysis indicates several factors which should be of
significant consideration to the Florida committee. First, the ultimate objective
of jury instructions is an accurate statement of the law.224 If the substantial
factor test is the test of causation used in a given jurisdiction, that test should
be applied in the definitional instruction on proximate cause. Additionally,
alternative use of the "but for" and substantial factor tests is counterproductive.225 A dual system only serves to confuse an attempt to reliably express the
law, and leads to inconsistent instructions.226 The larger the required number
of instructions, the more likelihood of confusing both judge and jury. Finally,
the concepts of cause in fact and proximate cause should be kept separated, for
they perform different functions,22 7 and only tend to confuse when entwined.
There should be separate instructions for cause in fact, concurring causes, and
intervening causes rather than incorporation of foreseeability with the definitional instruction. 228 A proposed instruction for Florida will be found in the
Appendix.
CONCLUSION

The "but for" and substantial factor tests achieve the same results in the

majority of negligence situations. However, in cases involving concurring,
221. See NEw YoRK PATrERN JuRY INSTRUCTIONS, CIviL, PJI 2:70 (2d ed. 1974). ("An act or
omission is a proximate cause of an injury if it was a substantial factor in bringing about the
injury, that is, if it had such an effect in producing the injury that reasonable men would
regard it as a cause of the injury.") The use of the substantial factor test is authorized by
New York case law. See, e.g., Dunham v. Canisteo, 303 N.Y. 498, 504, 104 N.E.2d 872, 877
(1952) (question of whether defendant's conduct substantially contributed to death of 76-yearold prisoner); Bacon v. Celest, 30 A.D.2d 324, 325, 292 N.Y.S.2d 48, 51 (1968) (substanial factor
may be used in a charge in a negligence case).
The "but for" rule is inconsistent with substantive rules of New York tort law because
when either of two independent acts may be found to be the cause of an injury, either or both
defendants may be held responsible for the whole injury. See NEw YoRK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCIONS, CIVIL PJI 2:70, Comment (2d ed. 1974). See also Slater v. Mersereau, 64 N.Y. 138
(1876).
222. See New York PatternJury Instructions, Civil PJI 2:71 (2d ed. 1974).
223. Id. at 2:72. The term "intervening cause" has been omitted from the body of the
instruction due to its misleading effect. See also note 219 supra regarding ARKANSAS MODEL
JURY INsTRucriONs, AMI 501 (2d ed. 1974).
224. See note 9 and accompanying text, supra.
225. See notes 205-206 and accompanying text, supra
226. See note 206 and accompanying text, supra.
227. See note 29 and accompanying text, supra.
228. See note 219 and accompanying text, supra.
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alternative, and successive causes, where each cause is sufficient to produce die
harm, the "but for" test fails to provide the result that justice requires in determinations of cause in fact. In those cases, the substantial factor test has
proven to be a superior and more reliable test. The Supreme Court of Florida
has approved the substantial factor test, but a conflict remains in the District
Courts of Appeal concerning the test's application. The discord should soon be
resolved in favor of the substantial factor test.
The supreme court has the opportunity to solve this conflict through its
control of standard jury instructions. The Florida Standard Jury Instructions
on legal cause have achieved most of their goals. However, retention of the
"but for" test, is inconsistent with the adoption of the substantial factor test in
Asgrow-Kilgore.229 The goal of accurately stating the Florida law of causation
has not been satisfied. The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions should submit a proposed instruction to the supreme court recommending use of the substantial factor test in determinations of legal cause, and
the supreme court should approve that instruction for use in the trial courts of
this state.
G. MACVAY VOGHT

APPENDIX

Proposed Instruction 5.1

LEGAL CAUSE
(In general, Concurring, Intervening)
(a) In general:
Negligence is a legal cause of (loss) (injury) (or) (damage) if it is a substantial factor in
bringing about the (loss) (injury) (or) (damage); that is if it had such an effect in producing
the (loss) (injury) (or) (damage) that reasonable men would regard it as a cause of the (loss)
(injury) (or) (damage).
(b) Concurring cause:
There may be more than one legal cause of (loss) (injury) (or) (damage). A defendant's
negligent conduct which is a substantial factor in producing (loss) (injury) (or) (damage) may
be a legal cause of the (loss) (injury) (or) (damage) even if it works together with (the act
of another) (or) some other cause, if the other cause occurs at the same time as the negligent
conduct. This is true regardless of the extent to which each person (or cause) is to blame.
(c) Intervening cause:
*[There may be more than one legal cause of (loss) (injury) (or) (damage)). A defendant's
negligent conduct which is a substantial factor in producing (loss) (injury) (or) (damage) may
be a legal cause of the (loss) (injury) (or) (damage) even if it works together with (the act of
another) (or) some other cause which occurs after the negligence if:
1.) (the act of the other person) (or) (other cause) was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant at the time of his negligent conduct, or
2.) the resulting (loss) (injury) (or) (damage) was a reasonable result of the defendant's
negligent conduct.
*Do not use the bracketed first sentence if this charge is preceded by the charge on concurring
cause (5.1(b)).
229.

See notes 129-135 and accompanying text, supra.
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Note on Use

1. Instruction 5.1(a) (legal cause in general) is to be given in all negligence cases.
2. Instruction 5.1(b) (concurring cause) should immediately follow 5.1(a) in cases where there
is evidence of concurring causes.
Instruction 5.1(b) does not set forth any additional standard for the jury to consider in determining whether negligence was a legal cause of injury. It only negates the idea that a
defendant is not liable by reason of some other cause concurring in time and contributing
to the same injury.
3. Instruction 5.1(c) (intervening cause) is to be given only in cases in which the court concludes that there is evidence of an efficient intervening cause. This instruction is limited t6
stating the circumstances under which the intervening negligence of a third person, which
was an immediate cause of the injury, does not become a superseding cause in place of the
defendant's negligence.
Comment
1. The purpose of instruction 5.1(a) is to express the substantial factor test on the authorit4 of
Florida case law. Asgrow-Kilgore Co. v. Mulford Hickerson Corp., 801 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1974);
Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1953); Jackson v. Florida Weathermakers, Inc., 55 So.
2d 575 (Fla. 1951). The instruction avoids the confusing term "proximate cause" and overcomes the inapplicability of the "but for" test of causation to two or more sufficient causes.
2. Instruction 5.1(b) correctly states the law of concurring causes in Florida. De La Concha v.
Pinero, 104 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1958); Starling v. City of Gainesville, 90 Fla. 613, 106 So. 425
(Fla. 1925). In what is felt to be simple language understandable to the layman, the term
"concurring cause" is not used in the instruction.
3. Instruction 5.1(c) includes two situations in which negligence may be a legal cause even
though there is an intervening cause:
1.) where the damage was a reasonably foreseeeable consequence of the negligence although
the other cause was not foreseeable. Autry v. Carroll,240 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 1970), and
2.) where the intervention of the other cause was foreseeable. Nicholas v. Miami Burglar
Alarm Co., Inc., 339 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1976).
In neither of these situations does an intervening cause become a superseding cause in
place of a defendant's antecedent negligence.
For the benefit of juror comprehension, the term "intervening cause" has been eliminated from the instruction.
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